“It is a fact that when it comes to the oddly resilient Japanese hyperlevered economic model, the bodies of those screaming for the end of the JGB bubble litter the sides of central planning’s tungsten brick road. Yet in the aftermath of last month’s stunning surge in the country’s trade deficit, this, and much more may soon be finally ending. Because as Caixin’s Andy Xie writes “The day of reckoning for the yen is not distant. Japanese companies are struggling with profitability. It only gets worse from here. When a major company goes bankrupt, this may change the prevailing psychology. A weak yen consensus will emerge then.” As for the bubble pop, it will be a sudden pop, not the 30 year deflationary whimper Mrs. Watanabe has gotten so used to: “Yen devaluation is likely to unfold quickly. A financial bubble doesn’t burst slowly. When it occurs, it just pops. The odds are that yen devaluation will occur over days. Only a large and sudden devaluation can keep the JGB yield low.Otherwise, the devaluation expectation will trigger a sharp rise in the JGB yield. The resulting worries over the government’s solvency could lead to a collapse of the JGB market.” It gets worse: “Of course, the government will collapse with the JGB market.” And once Japan falls, the rest of the world follows, says Xie, which is why he is now actively encouraging China, and all other Japanese trade partners of the world’s rapidly declining 3rd largest economy to take precautions for when this day comes… soon. Oh, and this: ” If the bond yield rises to 2 percent, the interest expense would surpass the total expected tax revenue of 42.3 trillion yen.”
Why has Japan been able to sustain its deflationary collapse for over 3 decades? Simply – an ever rising currency.
A strong yen, deflation and rising government debt form a short-term equilibrium that lasts as long as the market believes it is sustainable. The yen has seen a relentless upward trend since it depegged from the dollar in 1971, up to 83.4 from 360 again to the dollar. When wages and asset prices rise, a strong currency can be justified. When wages and asset prices fall, a strong currency is suicide. Japan’s nominal GDP peaked in 1997 and its nominal wages did too. Its property prices have declined every year since. The Nikkei rose in only four out of the last fifteen years and is still close to a three-decade low.
Japanese policymakers, businesses, academics, currency traders and the average Mrs. Watanabe all believe in a strong yen. This belief is wrong but self-fulfilling. It has lasted so long because the Japanese government adopts policies to offset the destabilizing effects of deflation due to a strong yen. Hence, Japan’s national debt has marched upwards along with the value of yen. It is expected to top yen 1,000 trillion in 2012, 215 percent of GDP, 7.8 million yen (or roughly US$ 94,000) per person, and about half of net household wealth per capita.
The sustainability of Japan’s deflationary path depends on the market’s confidence in Japan’s debt market. As Japanese institutions and households hold almost all of the government’s debts, their faith in the government’s creditworthiness is the mojo for Japan’s seemingly harmless deflationary spiral.
There’s that. And also that it is nothing but a ponzi. In Xie’s words.
The justification for the low JGB yield is deflation. The real interest rate (the nominal rate plus deflation) is comparable to that in other countries. This rationale requires deflation to persist. But, deflation shrinks the nominal GDP or tax base. How could the government pay back its escalating debt by taxing a shrinking economy? It can only sustain its debt by borrowing more. This fits the definition of a particular type of Ponzi scheme.
Deflation is ok, if in addition to collapsing GDP, it is paralleled by declining wages.
The JGB bubble explains the seeming lack of pain in Japanese society. A strong yen and deflation haven’t led to an employment crisis because the government deficit is pumping up aggregate demand. As long as wages decline in line with prices, one doesn’t feel the pain. Japan’s household debt is only half of GDP, about half of the level in the United States. Deflation doesn’t cause much balance sheet trouble.
Unfortunately this is unsustainable by definition, as the divergence is a finite series at which point it become self-destructive. And yet the strong Yen is the glue that ties the rickety house of cards together… for now.
Despite the fact Japan has had a bad economy for so long, the yen has remained strong. It reinforces the Japanese psyche on the issue. The strong yen has become a cult.
The international financial market believes in a weak yen from time to time. In 1998, the short-selling by foreigners briefly caused the yen to touch 140 against the U.S. dollar. But, as the Japanese hold all of the yen, if they believe in the yen, foreign short-sellers get punished eventually. Over time, yen bears are all weeded out of the market. The remaining yen traders are all believers in a strong yen.
So far so good: any cult can exist in its own bubble if left to its own devices. However, as much as it is trying to avoid it, Japan’s secular role in international society is changing, and very soon the habitual self-delusion of its citizens, politicians, and FX traders will do nothing to offset the advent of reality….”
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